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after the concise but comprehensive disclosure requirements set forth in the
Model Savings Association Act."'
The alternative is further proliferation of nonuniform legislation which may
not only weaken the existing set of nationwide standards which the federal
regulatory agencies have established, but also may result in the application of
different standards for federal and state institutions operating within the same
state.
It would also seem desirable that any such legislation be uniformly applied
to all investment sources which compete for the same consumer dollar, so that
not only would savings associations, banks and credit unions be covered, but
also institutions such as insurance companies and mutual funds. Such uniform
standards would better effect the professed purpose of truth-in-savings legisla-
tion, that is, to enable consumers to make intelligent choices about where to
invest their money. If strict disclosure standards are imposed on only one
segment of the investment market (depository institutions), consumers still
will not be able to make intelligent decisions because all choices are not
presented in the same disclosure format. In short, if there is to be legislation
which imposes a designated standard of truth, it ought to be uniform or it will
fall short of its objective.
III. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AMENDS THE "HOLDER" RULE-
(By RALPH J. ROHNER)*
The Federal Trade Commission has finally dropped the other shoe with
respect to its Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims
and Defenses. In late 1979 the Commission adopted and published for stylistic
comment32 the long-awaited amendment to its 1975 antiholder in due course
rule."3 The amendment extends compliance responsibilities under the Rule to
"creditors" in addition to "sellers," rewrites the mandatory "Notice" for
31. The Act, § 25, would require that rules of account be established for each account
classification and be made available to each holder of a savings account. The rules should include
at the minimum the following information: the interest or earnings rate, based on a period of one
year; the effective interest or earnings rate, based on a period of one year; the method of
computing the frequency of compounding and the time factor used in calculating earnings,
expressed as a fraction; the date the account begins to earn the interest or earnings; the intervals
at when the interest or earnings are credited; the period for which the interest or earnings are
fixed, or if the interest or earnings are not fixed, a statement that the rate is an anticipated rate;
the minimum balance required to earn the interest or earnings; the minimum term, if any,
required for the interest or earnings rate; any penalty or loss of interest for withdrawal, transfer or
termination; any provision relating to the interest or earnings to be paid after the conclusion of a
fixed term or renewal; any charge which may be imposed on the account and the conditions under
which such charge may be imposed; and a description of the evidence of account, if any. The
Model Savings Association Act, Legal Bulletin 237, July 1979.
*Member of the Maryland bar; member of the Committee on Consumer Financial Services.
32. Amendment to Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers' Claims
and Defenses, 44 Fed. Reg. 65771 (Nov. 15, 1979).
33. FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16
C.F.R. Part 433 (1979).
Recent Developments • 1319
improved clarity, and adds provisions that will relieve sellers and creditors
from the risk of inadvertent violations.
A. Background
The original "Holder" Rule (Holder 1) was promulgated in November
1975, effective on May 14, 1976. It was a major FTC effort to uproot the
venerable holder in due course doctrine, a doctrine in which negotiable
instruments or contractual waiver-of-defense clauses were used to separate
the credit buyer's duty to pay from the seller's duty to perform-i.e., under
the law in many states, an installment buyer whose note or credit contract was
assigned to a bank or finance company could be required to pay that financer
even though the purchased goods or services were defective. The mechanism
of the original rule requires the seller to insert in each credit contract a
specified Notice3' which expressly preserves the buyer's claims and defenses as
a matter of contract.
The original rule also dealt with the cognate "purchase money loan"
situation. This refers to a pattern in which the consumer borrows directly from
a lender in order to purchase goods or services from a seller who has a
continuing working relationship'5 with that lender. The FTC found that this
pattern also operated unfairly to cut off consumer claims and defenses arising
from the sale, and so the rule provided that the seller could not accept the
proceeds of a "purchase money loan" unless the specified Notice appeared in
the loan instrument." This would then constitute an agreement by the lender
to be subject to sales claims and defenses.
Under the original rule, the entire burden of compliance fell on the sellers,
and none on the third-party financiers. That is, while the FTC could prosecute
sellers who failed to put the Notice in their credit contracts, or who failed to
see that the Notice was included in purchase money loan agreements, there
was no responsibility on the part of the financers (who often printed and
supplied the dealer's forms, or, in the case of purchase money loans, took and
held the consumer's note). The Commission therefore published, along with
the final version of the original rule, a proposed amendment 7 extending the
compliance duty to financers as well as sellers. It is a modified form of this
34. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (1979). The "NOTICE" reads as follows:
Any holder of this Consumer Credit Contract is subject to all claims and defenses which the
debtor could assert against the seller of goods or services obtained pursuant hereto or with
the proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall not exceed amounts paid by the
debtor hereunder.
35. The definition of "purchase money loan" in original 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1979) refers to
loans applied to purchase "goods or services from a seller who (I ) refers consumers to the creditor
or (2) is affiliated with the creditor by common control, contract or business arrangement." The
terms "contract" and "business arrangement" are further defined in 16 C.F.R. § 433.1 (f) and (g)
(1979).
36. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(b) (1979).
37. 40 Fed. Reg. 53530 (1975).
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amendment (Holder II) which the Commission has now adopted, more than
four years after it was first proposed.
B. Scope of the Amended Rule
The principal change in the rule, as amended, is to make it an unfair or
deceptive act or practice for a creditor (as well as a seller, under Holder I) to
acquire any consumer credit contract which does not have the specified Notice
in it. 8 This general proscription applies both in connection with credit sales
(where the "creditor" purchases dealer paper) and in connection with
purchase money loans (where the "creditor" lends directly to a consumer
buyer). For any creditor who has been discounting dealer paper or making
purchase money loans, and whose paper already includes the Notice required
under Holder 1, the amended rule does not increase the creditor's exposure to
consumer claims or defenses; the financer's position vis-ti-vis the consumer is
unchanged. But a financer (other than a bank or savings association) is now
subject to the enforcement authority of the FTC if the specified notice is
omitted.
By virtue of a provision in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 9 the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board are now required to
enact a similar rule for banks and savings associations, respectively, unless
those agencies find that financial institutions have not engaged in the decep-
tive or unfair practices or that a rule would interfere with other essential
regulatory functions of those agencies. The Federal Reserve Board had earlier
issued a proposed regulation identical to the FTC's proposal." Now that the
FTC has finalized its version (incorporating many of the Federal Reserve
staff's recommendations), it is likely the Federal Reserve and the Bank Board
will issue companion rules fairly soon.
C. Other Features
In addition to extending the coverage of the rule to creditors, the amend-
ment makes several other changes.
In order to "make the provision more understandable by consumers without
changing its legal significance in any way'"' the Commission voted to change
the specified text to read as follows (in 10-point, boldface type):
This credit contract finances a purchase. All legal rights which the
buyer has against the seller arising out of this transaction, including all
claims and defenses, are also valid against any holder of this contract.
The right to recover money from the holder under this provision is limited
to the amount paid by the buyer under this contract.
38. 44 Fed. Reg. at 65772 (1979), amending 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1979).
39. Federal Trade Commission Act § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (1976).
40. 41 Fed. Reg. 7110 (1976).
41. 44 Fed. Reg. at 65772 (1979).
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A claim is a legally valid reason for suing the seller. A defense is a
legally valid reason for not paying the seller. A holder is anyone trying to
collect for the purchase.
This will no longer be captioned "Notice," so as to emphasize that it is a
contract clause and not merely a disclosure of information. This text may
narrow the meaning of the original Notice somewhat. The old version did not
limit the consumer's claims and defenses to those "arising out of this
transaction" (although that was clearly the Commission staff's intent). The
insertion of this phrase in the new text should prevent consumers from using
unrelated claims against the creditor as setoffs for the credit obligation. 2
The amended rule provides a Spanish-language version42 of the text quoted
above, for inclusion in any contract "required by law to be written in
Spanish."
The original rule contained a number of ambiguities about "purchase
money loans"-what exactly was included in that term; how could a lender
assure that loan proceeds were actually used with a specified seller; and what
liability attached if a seller or creditor unknowingly engaged in a purchase
money loan transaction without including the required Notice? These ques-
tions were answered to some degree in an FTC Statement of Enforcement
Policy issued in August 1976." The amended rule now incorporates several of
these answers into the rule itself. The definition of purchase money loan is
streamlined, but without change in substance.45 More importantly, the new
rule permits a purchase money lender to stipulate that it is subject to claims
and defenses only if the consumer purchases from a specifically named seller.
4 6
This should avoid the problem that arises when a consumer tells the lender he
intends to purchase goods or services from an affiliated seller but then changes
his mind and buys from an unaffiliated merchant. In addition, the rule now
42. An interesting question is whether the holder will be subject to claims for TIL or ECOA
violations. The courts have not consistently decided whether such claims "arise out of" the sale
transaction. See the TIL (supra at 1197-1222 and 1221-36) and ECOA (supra at 1237-58)
articles in this Survey.
43. Id. [proposed new 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(c)].
44. 41 Fed. Reg. 34594 (1976).
45. The new definition of "purchase money loan" in amended 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) speaks of
sellers and creditors who are "affiliated... by common control or business arrangement." Specific
mention of "contract" or "referral" relationships is dropped. But the new definition of "business
arrangement" [proposed 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(f)] is very broad:
... Any tacit, oral, or written agreement or understanding, formal or informal, between a
creditor and a seller in connecton with the sale of goods or services or the financing thereof,
including cooperative activity between a creditor and a seller in referring consumers to
purchase goods or to obtain financing. The term shall not include arrangements, such as
inventory financing, maintenance of ordinary checking accounts or joint action engaged in
merely to perfect a security interest, which are not directed at the financing of consumer
purchases.
The last sentence of this definition restates qualifications adopted by the Commission itself in
its 1976 Statement of Enforcement Policy. See n. 13, supra at 34595.
46. 44 Fed. Reg. at 65772 [proposed new 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(d)].
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expressly recognizes that there is no violation unless the failure to comply is




The Commission was scheduled to receive comments on possible stylistic
language changes in the rule through January 14, 1980. Thus, at the time this
is written, the absolutely final version of Holder II has not yet appeared. The
Commission will set an effective date only on final promulgation. In sum, the
Commission is on the verge of implementing the second part of its attack on
holder in due course, by extending the coverage of the Holder Rule to
creditors as well as sellers.
IV. FREE PERIODS IN CONNECTION WITH REVOLVING CREDIT ACCOUNTS
-(By CARL D. LOBELL and JOSEPH W. GELB)*
A 1979 decision in New York could have a substantial impact on the nature
of the free period normally accorded on revolving charge accounts. That
decision involves the revolving charge provisions of section 413(a) of New
York's Personal Property Law, which contains language similar to that in
revolving credit statutes of many states.48 Although the case is on appeal to
New York's highest court, the intermediate appellate court's opinion is
important for the views expressed concerning extensions of consumer credit.
A. Imposition of Finance Charges on Revolving Accounts
In Sternberg v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc.,49 the court dealt with the
imposition of a 50k minimum finance charge in any month in which a
purchase was made on a revolving charge account. The charge was designed
partially to compensate for the handling costs involved, and, in imposing the
minimum charge, the bank eliminated, at least to the extent of 50¢, the "free
period" which had been traditionally granted in connection with purchases on
revolving charge accounts.
Prior to the imposition of the 50¢ minimum monthly charge, finance
charges on Citibank's plan were calculated according to a so-called modified
average daily balance method. Under that method, a finance charge is
computed each month on an amount representing the average daily balance in
the account, except that a finance charge is not imposed in any month in which
the beginning balance (the prior month's ending balance) is paid in full or in
any month in which there is no beginning balance. In late 1975 Citibank
47. Id. [proposed new 16 C.F.R. § 433.3].
*Members of the New York bar.
48. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 5-19-3 (1977); Alaska Stat. § 45.10.120 (1962); Cal. Civil Code
§ 1810.2 (West 1973); Del. Code Ann. tit. 5 § 4337 (1975); Fla. Stat. § 520.35 (1975); Ga. Code
§ 96-904(b) (1975); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121/ § 528 (1971); N.D. Cent. Code § 51-14-03 (1974);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-11-104 (1979); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2406(c) (1970).
49. 419 N.Y.S.2d 142 (2nd Dep't 1979).
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changed the terms of its plan to provide that finance charges would be imposed
in a month in which there was a purchase even where the beginning balance
was paid in full or in any month in which there is no beginning balance.
Citibank also decided that under such circumstances the finance charge would
not be based upon the average daily balance in the account during the month,
but that the account would be subject to only a 50¢ minimum finance charge.
The statute involved in Sternberg provides that the holder of a revolving
charge account may charge a service charge "computed ... on the outstand-
ing indebtedness from month to month.""0 In reaching its conclusion that the
minimum monthly charge was unlawful, the court first determined that a
minimum finance charge can only be imposed in a month in which a periodic
finance charge could otherwise be imposed. It then held that regardless of
whether a purchase had been made, the statute did not permit a finance
charge in a month in which the beginning balance was paid in full since
neither the beginning balance nor the purchase satisfied what the court
believed to be the statutory requirement that "the indebtedness has been
outstanding from month to month" before a finance charge may be imposed.5 '
The court rejected Citibank's contention that, where a purchase is made, an
indebtedness is necessarily carried over from month to month so as to satisfy
even the court's reading of the statute. The court found instead that a
purchase does not result in an indebtedness at the time made or when posted to
the cardholder's account but, rather, results in an indebtedness only when a
monthly statement is issued reflecting the purchase. In other words, a





The conclusion of the Appellate Division concerning the creation of
indebtedness seems at best novel. For years courts interpreting the
forebearance language in usury statutes have considered a debt to come into
existence concurrently with an extension of credit. Sellers and those who
finance sellers consider amounts owed to be assets from the day purchases are
made, and credit buyers no doubt consider themselves obligated for purchases
when they are made. The logical extension of the Appellate Division's
reasoning is that a customer who makes a purchase has no obligation to pay,
express or implied, until a statement is rendered.
In essence the court's objection to the bank's minimum finance charge
appears based on the fact that it does away with a period of free credit.
50. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 413(a) (McKinney 1976).
51. Supra n. 49, at 147.
52. The support offered by the Appellate Division for this conclusion is that if it were
otherwise and if, for example, purchases were not billed for six months, it would be "unreasonable
and illogical" to consider the indebtedness outstanding for six months even though "the customer
was not in default."
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However, to view the words "outstanding indebtedness from month to month"
as mandating a free period for open end credit seems inconsistent with the
decision of New York's highest court in Zachary v. R. H. Macy & Co., where
the court found that the statutory words merely require that the finance
charge "be computed at consistent monthly intervals on the customer's
outstanding indebtedness at that time. 5 3 In addition, the Appellate Division's
decision seems inconsistent with the statutory scheme as shown in the
provisions regulating closed end credit, which in Zachary were noted to
contain "certain parallels in treatment." Significantly, the finance charge on a
closed end credit transaction is computed, without a free period, from the date
of the contract or obligation to the date when the final installment is payable. 4
Further, the concept of mandated free credit is so unusual as to have required
a specific amendment to New York's law providing for certain free periods in
connection with revolving accounts maintained by retailers.5
The Sternberg decision is the first to mandate a free period through
interpretation of the words "computed on the outstanding indebtedness from
month to month." Should creditors faced with higher costs of maintaining
revolving charge programs eliminate the free period, Sternberg, if affirmed,
will no doubt provide a basis for increased revolving credit litigation through-
out the nation.
V. REPOSSESSIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT-(By
CARL D. LOBELL and JOSEPH W. GELB)*
In 1979 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) accepted a consent order
and handed down a decision addressing important questions with respect to
the disposition of repossessed collateral. If affirmed on appeal, this decision
53. 340 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1972). The Appellate Division cited Zachary as support for its
conclusion. In Zachary, the Court of Appeals held that the use of the previous balance method to
compute finance charges complied with the statutory mandate for a finance charge computed on
the outstanding indebtedness from month to month. The Zachary court interpreted the words
'month to month" as relating to the frequency of imposition of the finance charge and not, as did
the Appellate Division in Sternberg, as describing the period of time for which an indebtedness
must be outstanding. Indeed, the Zachary court expressly rejected a contention that the words
"outstanding indebtedness from month to month" meant that a finance charge could only be
computed on an amount which had been carried over from one month to another. Id. at 917.
54. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 404(l).
55. This amendment, enacted after the Citibank minimum charge was put into effect, provides
in § 413(3)(e)(ii):
[Nbo seller may impose a service charge for the monthly billing period in which there is no
previous balance or during which the sum of the payments received and other credits issued
which are attributable to amounts included in the previous balance is equal to or exceeds the
amount of such previous balance.
See also, Massachusetts Gen. Laws Ann. 255D, § 27C(3)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1979) ("... a finance
charge ... computed upon ... the average daily balance ... excluding purchases."); Me. Rev.
Stat. tit. 9-A, § 2.202(5) ("No finance charge may be imposed on purchases or leases ... during
the billing cycle, provided that they are paid for not later than 25 days after the closing date of the
billing cycle in which the purchase or lease occurred").
*Members of the New York bar.
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will have a significant impact on the rights and duties of creditors and debtors
and on relationships between sellers and their financing sources.
A. Disposition of Repossessed Collateral
In February 1976 the FTC instituted three proceedings against the major
automobile manufacturers, their affiliated credit companies, and one of each
of their franchised dealers. 6 In each of these proceedings the complaint
alleged that the disposition of repossessed vehicles by respondents and the
subsequent accounting to the defaulting debtor for the proceeds of sale were in
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
In the only proceeding which has been disposed of by the FTC to date," the
FTC charged that the Ford dealer, Francis Ford, Inc. (Francis Ford), (1)
disposed of certain repossessed vehicles for an amount greater than that which
the debtor owed and (2) failed to pay the surplus to the debtor, as required
under section 9-504(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The FTC
further alleged that Ford Motor Credit Company (Ford Credit), which
repossessed the collateral, was also responsible to debtors for surpluses
improperly retained by Francis Ford, even though Ford Credit reassigned
debtors' credit obligations to dealers pursuant to recourse agreements.
8
Finally, the FTC alleged that Ford Motor Company controlled certain
dealerships in which it held majority stock interests and, on the basis of such
control, was liable for the failure of such dealerships to remit surpluses to
certain defaulting debtors.
With respect to the allegations against Ford Credit and Ford Motor
Company, after three years of post-complaint discovery and prehearing
conferences, Ford Motor Company and Ford Credit entered into a consent
order with the FTC resolving the proceeding as against them. 9
B. Financer's Responsibility
A basic legal issue involved between those parties was whether a finance
company which repossesses collateral and reassigns the debtor's contractual
obligation to the selling dealer pursuant to a recourse agreement, is neverthe-
less liable to a debtor for a surplus which may result from disposition of the
collateral by that dealer. On the basis of section 9-504(5)10 of the UCC, the
Ford respondents contended that they, as opposed to the dealer, had no
56. In re Chrysler Corporation, Chrysler Credit Corporation and Aurora Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9072; In re Ford Motor Company, Ford Motor Credit Company and Francis
Ford, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9073; In re General Motors Corporation, General Motors Acceptance
Corporation and Chuck Olson Chevrolet, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9074.
57. Neither the Chrysler nor the General Motors proceedings have been heard as yet.
58. The recourse agreements obligated selling dealers to pay Ford Credit amounts approxi-
mating the debtors' obligations, if Ford Credit repossessed the collateral and returned such
collateral to dealers in a timely manner.
59. The consent order is reported at [1976-79 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
21,477.
60. That section provides:
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obligation to account to debtors in this situation, since the assignee (dealer) is,
by the express language of that section, subrogated to "the rights and duties of
the secured party."'" In contrast, the FTC staff contended that section 9-
504(5) does not relieve the assignor from liability for any surplus resulting
from disposition following reassignment, but merely underscores the as-
signee's liability as well. The staff also argued that as a matter of policy and
fairness under section 5 of the FTC Act, the finance company should remain
liable to the debtor for any surplus derived by its assignee because the finance
company is the dominant party in the financing transaction, because the
finance company can better adapt to and absorb the risk of an assignee's
failure to account than the debtor can, and because the finance company
undertakes a fiduciary obligation to the debtor when it repossesses the
collateral.
Significantly, there is no clear resolution of a reassignment creditor's
liability in the consent order. Rather, the order provides that the Ford
respondents will instruct reassignment dealers of their obligation to pay
surpluses and advise dealers of the manner in which such surpluses are to be
calculated. The consent order further requires that for a limited period of time
Ford Motor Company will audit selected dealerships to determine whether
they are computing and paying surpluses in conformity with the procedures
set forth in the consent order. The results of such audits are to be reported to
the FTC."
C. The Dealer's Responsibility
Apparently unable to reach settlement, the dealer, Francis Ford, went to
hearing and the Administrative Law Judge rendered a decision on liability
and accounting procedures which was affirmed in most respects by the
Commission. 3 Francis Ford has indicated that it will appeal the Commission's
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, indorsement, repurchase
agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party or is
subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured party. Such a
transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the collateral under this Article.
61. In support of this contention, the Ford respondents could cite a number of state cases
indicating that a secured party which repossesses collateral is not obligated to account to the
debtor for a surplus after the credit obligation has been reassigned. Reeves v. Assoc. Fin. Servs.
Co., 247 N.W.2d 434 (Neb. 1976); Community Management Ass'n of Colorado Springs, Inc. v.
Tousley, 505 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1973).
62. With regard to the Commission's claim that Ford Motor Company was liable for the
failure of dealerships in which it held an equity interest to remit surpluses, the consent order again
does not resolve the issue. Rather, the order simply requires Ford Motor Company to undertake
certain auditing responsibilities with regard to the repossession accounting practices of those
dealerships and requires the payment of money by certain of those dealerships which repossessed
and resold vehicles in the past.
63. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,622 (Sept. 21, 1979). The order of the Administrative
Law Judge was rejected insofar as it prohibited Francis Ford from taking waivers of resale rights
under § 9-505(2) of the UCC. The Commission allowed such waivers but narrowly interpreted
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The issues involved include: (1) whether the failure to remit surpluses in
violation of section 9-504(2) of the UCC is also a violation of the fairness
standard set forth in section 5 of the FTC Act, and (2) what is the appropriate
method by which a surplus or deficiency is to be calculated.
On the first issue-the failure to remit-the Administrative Law Judge and
the Commission had little difficulty in finding section 5 liability. The Commis-
sion stated:
The failure to account for and refund surpluses (based upon the proceeds
of a commercially reasonable resale of collateral by a secured party
acting as a fiduciary for the debtor, endeavoring to obtain the best
possible price, and deducting only reasonable out-of-pocket expenses
attributable to repossesion) is contrary to public policy established by the
uniform law of 49 states and the District of Columbia .... No more
certain source of public policy than state law can be imagined.
The failure to accord customers their right to a refund is, as well,
oppressive to consumers and the cause of substantial injury to them....
For these reasons we hold that the failure to account for and refund
surpluses by a party obligated under state law to do so is an unfair
practice within the meaning of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act."4
On the second issue-the method of computation-Francis Ford argued
that the results of an actual sale, if any, should be ignored and that instead the
debtor should be credited with the estimated wholesale value of the collateral
at the time of repossession. It contended that this figure was the appropriate
value to be used in determining a surplus or deficiency since: (1) such estimate
is the best measure of the amount the collateral could have been sold for on an
"as is" basis at the time of repossession, and (2) the debtor is not entitled to
any amount received above the estimated wholesale value since such added
value is solely the result of Francis Ford's efforts in repairing, reconditioning
and marketing the vehicle.
Both the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission rejected Francis
Ford's argument on value, holding that the UCC's standard of commercial
reasonableness requires that there be an actual sale and that the secured party
must endeavor to obtain the best possible price for the collateral. The
Commission held that it was obliged to credit the defaulting debtor with the
actual resale price obtained after repairing, reconditioning and selling the
collateral through the dealership facilities on the retail market.
65
the UCC provisions to apply only where the creditor "intends to retain the collateral for its own
use.
64. Id. at 21,762.
65. The Commission's decision does not prohibit a disposition on the wholesale market by a
dealer, although it is likely that under the best price requirement such disposition would have to
be justified by the circumstances, including, among other things, condition of the vehicle. Where a
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Francis Ford next turned to the issue of allowable expenses, seeking
permission to deduct from the sale price all of its costs for repairing,
reconditioning and reselling the vehicle, including overhead costs allocable to
such tasks and the profit lost by having to resell a repossession rather than
another used vehicle. In one of the most significant aspects of its decision, the
Commission held that section 9-504(l)(a) of the UCC, which allows a
deduction from the proceeds of sale for the "reasonable expenses of retaking,
holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like," did not
authorize the secured party to deduct either overhead expense or lost profit
opportunity cost. Indicating that it was unable "to discover since enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code [any case which] addresses the question of
allowable expenses head on,' 66 and acknowledging the existence of respecta-
ble economic arguments for allowing overhead and lost profit opportunity
cost, the Commission nevertheless expressed the view that as a matter of both
precedent and fairness such deductions should not be permitted.
At no point did the Commission indicate that it was establishing new
standards for the disposition of and accounting for repossessions under its
section 5 powers. On the contrary, wherever possible, it relied on UCC
authority. Whatever the Commission's articulated statements, however, it is
clear from the manner in which it resolved the overhead and lost profit
opportunity cost issues that the Commission will likely interpret UCC
provisions so as to conform to the Commission's views of fairness under
section 5 of the FTC Act. Such willingness to venture into areas which have
traditionally evolved through state court decisions may signify yet further
excursions of the Commission into regulation of consumer credit.
VI. TRUTH IN LENDING ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES-
(By D. EDWIN SCHMELZER)*
A. Introduction
Perhaps the most significant Truth in Lending Act67 event during 1979 was
the implementation of the so-called Uniform Guidelines for the Enforcement
of the Truth in Lending Act.66 Promulgated effective January 4, 1979, by the
five federal agencies that regulate commercial banks, savings and loan
associations, and credit unions, these Guidelines require supervised creditors
to refund examiner-discovered "overcharges" based on inaccurate Truth in
Lending disclosures, principally the annual percentage rate ("APR") or
finance charge. In addition, the Guidelines require creditors to provide
wholesale disposition is made, it is the actual price realized which would have to be credited to the
debtor.
66. Id. at 21,760.
* Member of the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia bars; member of the Committee
on Consumer Financial Services and chairman of its TIL Subcommittee.
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65a (1976) as amended. Other Truth in Lending developments are
discussed in a separate article in this Annual Survey.
68. 44 Fed. Reg. 1222 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Guidelines).
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affected customers with a written statement explaining the reason for such
refunds. The Guidelines establish a tolerance of I/8 of 1 percent more or less
than the actual APR as the measure for determining overcharges.
Within months after the federal supervisory agencies began applying the
Guidelines, significant problems developed because of the complexity of Truth
in Lending Act and the Guidelines' rigid retroactivity rule which required
refunds for all overcharge violations occurring after October 28, 1974.9 The
American Bankers Association on August 7, 1979, filed an action challenging
the agencies' authority to promulgate the Guidelines.7 1 On September 7, 1979
the Guidelines were suspended for review, and on October 19, 1979, the
Financial Institutions Examination Council published proposed amendments
to increase the Guidelines' tolerance for accuracy in disclosure." While these
proposals were pending, the United States Senate amended the Truth in
Lending Simplification and Reform Bill (S.108),72 to establish differing
enforcement rules, and attached the amended S.108 as a rider to the
Depository Institutions Deregulation Bill (H.R. 4986).13 This legislative
package failed to emerge from the first session of the 96th Congress, but was
before a Senate-House Conference Committee as this article went to press.
The limited scope of this review does not permit a thorough analysis of the
Guidelines as they were first proposed in October, 1977,'7 finally adopted in
January, 1979, or proposed for further amendment in October, 1979. How-
ever, some discussion of these earlier provisions is essential to an understand-
ing of section 108(e) of the Simplification Bill which, whether ultimately
enacted or not, is likely to influence the form of future Guidelines or
enforcement action.
Section 108(e) is clearly a response by the Senate to the problems
encountered during the development and implementation of the agencies'
Guidelines.75 While those problems are myriad, the following issues have been
the most troublesome.
B. Authority to Require Refunds
Do the regulatory agencies have authority to require customer refunds
based on errors in the TIL disclosures? This question arises from the absence
of any expressed Congressional intent that refund orders were contemplated
69. For a discussion of the problems encountered in implementing the Guidelines, see 44 Fed.
Reg. 60402, 60403 (1979).
70. American Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, No. 79-
206 (D. D.C. 1979).
71. 44 Fed. Reg. 60402 (1979).
72. S.108, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
73. Truth in Lending Simplification is title IV of H.R. 4986. § 408 (captioned "Restitution")
amends § 108 of the Truth in Lending Act (hereinafter referred to as § 108(e)). See, Cong. Rec.
H 10267 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1979).
74. 42 Fed. Reg. 55786 (1977).
75. For a discussion of the enforcement problems sought to be remedied by § 108(e), see
Cong. Rec. S 15265, 15266 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1979) (remarks of Senators Proxmire and Garn).
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as an administrative enforcement mechanism under the original act. The
question has also been raised whether the agencies have authority to order
refunds under their general cease and desist powers.76 The enactment of
legislation such as section 108(e) would dispose of these questions of statutory
authority, but whether such authority is constitutionally permissible, particu-
larly as it relates to retroactive applications, may emerge as an issue in future
litigation.
C. Retroactivity of Enforcement
The Guidelines adopted a two-part rule for determining the retroactive
application of refund orders. All active loans consummated after October 28,
1974 were subject to reimbursement. Inactive (paid off) loans that had been
terminated within two years before the examination in which the overcharge
was discovered were also subject to refund.77 In adopting this rule, the
regulatory agencies followed the reimbursement provisions contained in the
original Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Bill, S. 2802,78 ignoring
the one-year statute of limitations for private civil actions contained under
section 130(e) of the Truth in Lending Act. This rule proved to be particularly
harsh for real estate lenders that hold longer term obligations.
Section 108(e) adopts a different approach which may be characterized as
the "last clean examination" rule.79 Depository institutions may be required to
refund for violations on loans that have been consummated during the time
between the immediate examination and the last preceding examination.
However, if overcharge violations were formally cited and not corrected in
earlier examinations, refund orders may relate back to the time that the
violation was first cited.
For creditors that are not subject to examination (e.g., retailers, finance
companies, etc.), refunds may be required for extensions of credit consum-
mated after May 10, 1978.10
As a prospective matter, section 108(e) provides that refunds may be
ordered only during the life of the credit extension or within two years of its
consummation, whichever is later."s
76. The agencies asserted statutory authority to effect such remedies based on 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(b) (commercial banks); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(2) and 1730(e) (savings and loan associa-
tions); 12 U.S.C. § 1786(e)(1) (credit unions).
77. 44 Fed. Reg. 1223 (1979).
78. S. Rep. No. 95-720, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1978).
79. § 108(e)(3)(C)(i). The "last clean examination" rule was first formally articulated in the
Financial Institutions Examination Council's proposal of October 1979. For a discussion of its
terms see 44 Fed. Reg. 60404 (1979).
80. § 108(e)(3)(C)(ii). May 10, 1978, was chosen as the cutoff reportedly because it was the
date that the Senate first passed S. 2802, thereby alerting the credit industry to the possibility of
refund orders.
81. § 108(e)(3)(C)(iii).
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D. Tolerance for Accuracy in Disclosure
The Guidelines required refunds where the disclosed APR is understated by
more than 1/8 of one percent."2 This rule created considerable confusion
because the APR disclosure tolerance permitted under Regulation Z was
widely, but inaccurately, considered to be /4 of one percent. 3 The Guidelines
also required refunds if the amount of finance charge was understated by more
than $1 or one percent, whichever is lower.8 4 The tolerance established under
the Guidelines was not determinative of the amount to be refunded; once the
l/8 of one percent was breached, the entire amount overcharged was subject to
refund. 5
Section 108(e) contains a more relaxed set of tolerance rules for APR and
finance charge disclosures that would be "phased in" over a two-year period.
Once enacted, it would require the regulatory agencies to apply a /4 of one
percent APR tolerance for the first two years. Beyond that, for closed-end
credit transactions with a term of up to ten years, a tolerance no greater than
/4 of one percent would be applied in calculating refunds. For transactions
with terms of more than ten years, a tolerance of 1/8 of one percent would be
applied.88 Moreover, the relaxed tolerances under section 108(e) not only
measure whether a refundable overcharge exists but also measure the amount
of any refund. 7 For example, in the first two years following the enactment of
section 108(e), refund orders would be limited to that portion of any
overcharge that is more than /4 of one percent above the actual amount that
should have been disclosed.
82. Note the definition of "understated APR" at 44 Fed. Reg. 1223 (1979).
83. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(a) and (b) (1979). The Federal Reserve Board staff has interpreted this
section as only permitting disclosure of the actual rate or the rate rounded to the nearest quarter
of one percent; see FRB Staff Opinion 442, February 25, 1971, 5 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH)
30,638.
84. Note the definition of "understated finance charge" at 44 Fed. Reg. 1223 (1979).
85. Id. at 1222.
86. § 108(e)(1)(A), (B). The amendment goes on to make three further exceptions at
§ 108(e)(2). First, with regard to those charges that may be excluded from the finance charge if
they are disclosed, no refunds are required. Specifically, disclosure errors related to charges that
may be excluded under § 106(c) and (d) of the Act (i.e., property damage insurance premiums,
title registration, and licensing fees, and filing fees and nonfiling insurance premiums) would not
be considered violations subject to refunds. The same exception would apply to credit life
insurance premiums (§ 106(b)); however, errors related to credit life insurance disclosures would
be subject to refund beginning two years after the Act's effective date. Second, refunds would not
be required in certain cases where the amount of the APR or finance charge disclosed was
10% or less of the proper amount or where the finance charge was in error but the APR was
correctly disclosed and vice versa, or where there was a total failure to disclose either the APR or
finance charge. Finally, there is a generalized exception at § 108(e)(2)(D) for errors resulting
from "any other unique circumstances involving clearly technical and nonsubstantive" errors that
do not "adversely affect information provided to the consumer" and do not "mislead or otherwise
deceive the consumer."
87. § 108(e)(1).
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E. Impact on Safety and Soundness of the Institution
The Guidelines do not specifically address the potential impact of Truth in
Lending refund orders on the "safety and soundness" of creditors. Ironically,
the cease and desist order authority relied upon by the regulators to enforce
refund orders is directed at insuring safe and sound banking practices. 8
During the implementation of the Guidelines, several smaller institutions
reportedly were faced with potentially staggering refund orders that in some
cases could have rendered them insolvent.
Section 108(e)(3)(A) responds to these concerns by indicating that no
refund shall be ordered "if it would have a significantly adverse impact on the
safety or soundness of the creditor, but in any such case the agency may
require a partial adjustment in an amount which does not have such an
impact."
F. Relation to Civil Liability
The Guidelines require that creditors explain to affected customers that the
refund is the result of the creditor's failure properly to disclose TIL informa-
tion. s9 This has posed a substantial problem for creditors: by informing
customers that the refund was the result of a Truth in Lending violation,
creditors invited civil suits under section 130(a) of the Act. Moreover, the
Guidelines clearly indicate that they are not intended to "foreclose the
customer's right to bring a civil action to recover for violations of the Act.""0
Section 415(a)(3) of H.R. 4986 would permit a creditor to foreclose
potential civil liability by promptly providing refunds. This section states that
creditors have no liability under section 130 if, within 60 days after discover-
ing a violation even by way of a "final examination report" and prior to the
institution of a civil action or notification by the customer, they notify affected
customers and make proper adjustments to their accounts. However, the
proper adjustment under the Act would amount to a refund of any amount
more than l/8 of 1 percent of the actual rate. This tolerance differs from the 14
of 1 percent established for many transactions under section 108(e) and will
present a dilemma to creditors faced with future refund orders. If they merely
refund amounts over the / of 1 percent tolerance and notify affected
customers, they may still face the prospect of civil suits under section 130(a).
G. De Minimis Rule
Except where violations were part of a pattern or practice, willful or due to
gross negligence, the Guidelines provide a $1 de minimis limit to refundable
88. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)l) justifies cease and desist orders where the "appropriate
Federal banking agency ... has reasonable cause to believe that the bank is about to engage in an
unsafe or unsound practice in conducting the business of such bank ......
89. 44 Fed. Reg. 1224 (1979).
90. Id. at 1222.
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overcharges." The appropriate level for a de minimis rule was hotly debated
during the development of the Guidelines, but generally proved to be a
spurious concern. This is because the accuracy tolerances effectively governed
whether a refund would be ordered. In closed-end credit transactions, once
these tolerances had been exceeded, the amount of the refund was almost
certain to be more than $1. Thus the most common application for the
Guideline's de minimis rule was in those cases where late payment fees,
prepayment penalties or rebates of unearned finance charges-items not
subject to the tolerance-were misdisclosed.
Like the Guidelines, section 108(e) retains a $1 de minimis rule.92 However,
the section limits refund orders to errors involving the APR and finance
charge, so there will be no refunds involving late payments, prepayment
penalties or rebates. Section 108(e)(3)(B) makes one further qualification to
the rule: "no refunds shall be ordered if the amount of the adjustment would
be less than $1, except that if more than one year has elapsed since the date of
the violation, the agency may require that such amount [less than $1] be paid
to the Treasury of the United States . .
H. Agency Discretion
The Guidelines are silent on whether the individual regulators could use
discretion in enforcing them, but each regulator reserved to itself the author-
ity to take "alternative action where warranted and [was] in no way precluded
from taking enforcement action for violations not covered by the guidelines.
'9 3
Section 108 effectively curtails the discretion the agencies may use in future
enforcement actions. The section provides that where there is evidence of a
"willful violation ... intended to mislead" the agencies may ignore tolerance
rules and order full refunds." However, before any refund may be ordered, the
underlying violation must be part of a pattern or practice or gross negligence
or, again, a willful violation. 95 Whenever gross negligence or a pattern or
practice is evident, refunds are mandated by the section. Still, agency
discretion is permitted, even with evidence of gross negligence and pattern or
practice, for certain violations of the Act's rules on insurance, filing fees, 10-
percent errors in amount, and nondisclosure or inaccurate disclosure of either
the finance charge or APR. 96 Finally, since refund orders will be limited to
finance charge and APR violations, the agencies' powers to require refunds for
other dollar-amount charges are eliminated. 7
91. Id. at 1223.
92. § 108(e)(3)(B).
93. 44 Fed. Reg. 1222 (1979).
94. § 108(e)(1).
95. § 108(e)(2).
96. See n. 86, supra.
97. § 108(e)(5).
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I. Conclusion
The development and attempted implementation of the Guidelines has
dramatically illustrated a lack of understanding of Truth in Lending disclo-
sure requirements and consequent creditor noncompliance. The Guidelines
have also revealed the inadequacy of Truth in Lending examination proce-
dures employed by the federal agencies prior to 1978, and the difficulty that
five regulatory agencies have in enforcing a uniform compliance standard for
a statute as technical and demanding of accuracy as Truth in Lending.
Hopefully, the standard enunciated in section 108(e) will better define proper
creditor compliance in this area of consumer protection.
POSTSCRIPT
On March 31, 1980, President Carter signed H.R. 4986 into law.98 Its
provisions respecting the bank regulatory agencies' authority to require
consumer refunds in the case of overcharge violations of the Truth in Lending
Act appear to have remained unchanged from the original Senate-passed
measure discussed above, with two significant exceptions: (1) Should a refund
order result in a significantly adverse impact upon the safety or soundness of a
creditor, the agency may permit the creditor to make partial refund payments
over an extended period of time; and (2) APR errors that have occurred
between January 1, 1977 and April 1, 1980 that exceed /4 of one percent of the
actual rate will be subject to refund irrespective of the so-called "last clean
examination rule." However, in no event will refunds be required after the
later of: the expiration of the term of the credit extension, or two years after
consummation of the credit agreement.
98. See n. 15, supra.
